An Offer You Can\u27t Revoke by Knapp, Charles L.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2004
An Offer You Can't Revoke
Charles L. Knapp
UC Hastings College of the Law, knappch@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't Revoke, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 309 (2004).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/337
Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: Charles L. Knapp
Title: An Offer You Can't Revoke
Source: Wisconsin Law Review
Citation: 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 309 (2004).
Copyright 2004 by The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System; Reprinted with 
permission of the WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW.
Knapp Charles
AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REVOKE
CHARLES L. KNAPP*
Under what circumstances a power of acceptance should be
terminated by these events [offeror revocations], is important
in itself. The issue is also important because it brings out both
the fault lines between classical and modern contract law and
certain difficulties in modern contract law itself.
In his article, The Revocation of Offers, Professor Melvin
Eisenberg continues his remarkable exploration of the basic concepts of
classical contract law. In a long series of articles, stretching over at
least the last twenty-five years,2 he has attempted to explain and in some
respects to justify many of the fundamental rules of traditional contract
law, while at the same time suggesting lines of development that would
better align those rules with policy goals such as efficiency and fairness.
This article can thus be seen as one more chapter in a long and ongoing
enterprise, one with major significance to all of us who are concerned
with teaching or writing about the law of contracts. To the extent that
this new article reflects the concerns about "freedom from contract" that
have inspired this Symposium, however, it does so in a somewhat
oblique fashion, being mainly concerned with reasons why traditional
rules about the presumptive revocability of ordinary offers might be
modified in the direction of greater or earlier enforceability. Thus,
adoption of his suggested rules would generally decrease freedom from
contract.
Weaving a web of analysis through and around classical rules,
Restatement of Contracts modifications (both the Restatement (First) of
Contracts (the "First Restatement") and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (the "Second Restatement")), and statutory innovations
(principally in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"Code")), Eisenberg examines the law's treatment of "firm" offers-a
term that in his view includes offers that contain an implicit promise of
nonrevocation, as well as those that are expressly irrevocable. Classical
contract law steadfastly regarded all offers-whether firm or not-as
* Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
California-Hastings College of the Law.
1. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 271,
272.
2. E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1979); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
640 (1982); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 CoLUM. L. REV.
1358 (1992). The above list is only illustrative; it is far from exhaustive.
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completely (and indeed blamelessly) revocable in the absence of an
ancillary "option contract" of nonrevocability, supported by
consideration. One by one, Eisenberg dissects the principal inroads on
this baseline rule: Section 45 (and to some extent Section 90) of both the
First and the Second Restatements, Section 87 of the Second
Restatement, and Section 2-205 of the Code.
While agreeing with many of the applications of these rules,
Eisenberg concludes by proposing a principle broader and simpler than
any of them, either singly or in the aggregate. In his view, until the
period of irrevocability terminates for some legally sufficient reason,
every firm offer should be deemed by the law to confer on the offeree
the power to call into being a full-fledged contract, notwithstanding any
attempts by the offeror at premature revocation. And any contract so
formed should be entitled to full-fledged enforcement, with expectation-
based remedies where feasible. Eisenberg's suggested rule would go
beyond existing law (as exemplified in the restatements and the Code) in
a number of respects: unlike Section 45 of both restatements, no
performance by the offeree should be required; unlike Section 87(1) of
the Second Restatement, no requirement of form should be imposed;
unlike Section 87(2) of the Second Restatement, no reliance by the
offeree need be demonstrated; unlike Section 2-205 of the Code, neither
form nor a "merchant" offeror would be requisites for his rule of
irrevocability. His analysis is thus both a simplifying and a unifying
one, bringing apparent order out of what can be seen as, if not exactly
chaos, at least a multiplicity of sometimes overlapping and sometimes
seemingly conflicting more particular rules.
There is much to admire in Eisenberg's serious and lucid
discussion. Like his other writings, it is eminently readable and
blessedly free of the kind of jargon that frequently makes theoretical
contract writing heavy sledding for the non-interdisciplinarians among
us. At the substantive level, his analysis makes a strong case in favor of
a simpler, unifying rule for enforcement of firm offers. His comparison
of Sections 45 and 90 of the restatements quite persuasively argues the
essential incoherence of some of the lines that their drafters, perhaps
constrained by existing case law, felt impelled to draw. And his
discussion of the motives that may lead some offerors to make expressly
firm offers seems perceptive and accurate. To be sure, he does argue
for a minimization of the importance of traditional consideration
doctrine in the offer and acceptance process, but as one who has in the
past been publicly skeptical of the importance of consideration, I am
hardly about to leap to its defense in this context.
3. Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future-and Vice Versa: Some
Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 932, 947 (1984).
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There are two aspects of his article, however, that seem to invite
some comment. The first goes to the most basic step in his argument:
the definition of a "firm offer." The other is a question about what we
mean when we talk-as Eisenberg repeatedly does-about "modem
contract law." I will address these two questions in that order below.
At the heart of Eisenberg's analysis is his definition of a firm offer.
As I noted earlier, Eisenberg first argues that any "offer" should be
considered as a promise "express or implied" to enter into a contract
according to its terms in the event of timely acceptance.' Obviously,
this argument blurs the distinction between express and implied
promises, but that troubles him not at all. He notes that many promises
are implied rather than express; indeed it is often a matter of
interpretation whether an expression is an offer at all.' On this score, he
is, of course, quite right. As thousands of law students discover every
year, it is indeed often hard to tell offers from other things-such as
preliminary inquiries-and it is the unusual offer;that actually contains
an express promise to enter into a contract. The implied- and express-
promise distinction plays little part at this stage because viewing an offer
as a "promise" in the Eisenbergian sense nearly always requires
implying a commitment that is not expressed in so many words. The
difficult question of interpretation here is typically not whether there is a
sufficient commitment to contract-making in general, but whether there
is a commitment to be bound without a further expression of assent by
the (potential) offeror: the issue of finality.6
However, when Eisenberg goes on to discuss "firm" offers, he
continues with the same sort of conflation of express and implied
promises. He states that offers that carry an express or implied promise
that the offer will be held open for a certain period of time are referred
to as "options" if supported by consideration, otherwise they are
referred to as "firm offers." 7 Having thus glossed over the difference
between promises expressed and promises implied, he never really
returns to address the possible importance of a distinction between
them.' But that distinction seems to me a potentially crucial one. In the
4. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 276.
5. Id.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 26 (1981).
7. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 279.
8. At one point in his discussion of offers for unilateral contracts (well after
the main thrust of his argument has been developed in the context of bilateral-contract
offers), Eisenberg does briefly note the possibility that there might be some difficulty in
knowing whether a given offer contained an implicit promise to keep the offer open. Id.
at 293.
It is possible that in a given case, considering the terms of the offer and the
surrounding circumstances, an offer for a unilateral contract would not
properly be interpreted to carry in train an implied promise to hold the offer
2004:309
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ordinary case of an "option contract," there is indeed an express
promise to keep the offer open, in exchange for consideration-probably
monetary-that is paid or at least "purported" to be paid. That promise
might be expressed in different ways, but its essence is the same: the
offer will not be revoked, at least for some period of time, and the
offeror can therefore safely delay her acceptance without fear of
revocation, so long as she does not delay past the assured period of
"firmness." Section 2-205 of the Code talks of an offer which contains
"assurance that it will be held open," making the application of that rule
turn on (among other things) an express assurance of irrevocability. 9
This assurance is clearly what the Code means here by "firmness."
Section 87(l) of the Second Restatement is more oblique, speaking of an
offer that "recites a purported consideration for the making of the offer,
and proposes an exchange of fair terms within a reasonable time."' 0 But
the effect of that suggested rule is to make the offer binding as an
"option contract," and the comments suggest that the drafters envisioned
a "firm offer" or the offer of an "option contract.""
Why does it matter that Eisenberg for the most part ignores the line
between express and implied promises? Because the reasons for
enforcement are different, and substantially stronger, in the case of an
expressly "firm" offer. Both Section 2-205 of the Code and Section
87(1) of the Second Restatement are rules of form as well as substance.
12
When an offer that purports to be irrevocable (or "firm") is made in a
certain form, the offeree should feel confident that the offer is indeed
irrevocable, and be encouraged to rely without fearing that it will be
snatched away by a surprise revocation. But when an offer-even one
open until the offeree has a reasonable time to begin acting and complete
performance.
Id. at 293 n.62. But the offer for a "true" unilateral contract is apt to be a good
candidate for an implicit promise not to revoke; indeed, Section 45 of the Second
Restatement comes close to making such a promise implicit as a matter of law,
presumably because once performance has begun the offeror is getting some traditional
consideration (in the form of a partial performance) for her offer. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 45. On the other hand, whether an offer for a
bilateral contract should be so interpreted is apt to be a much harder question.
9. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(1)(a).
11. See, e.g., id. § 87 cmt. a (discussing a "firm offer or option contract"); id.
§ 87 cmt. b (discussing the "short-time option"); id. § 87 cmt. c (discussing the "option
agreement"); id. § 87 cmt. e (discussing the "offer ... made expressly irrevocable").
It appears that Section 87 of the Second Restatement has seldom been applied to offers
that are not expressly irrevocable, except in the subcontractor-bidding context, and its
wisdom outside that area has been sharply questioned. See Margaret N. Kniffin,
Innovation or Aberration: Recovery for Reliance on a Contract Offer, as Permitted by
the New Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 23, 23-24 (1984).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(1)
(discussing binding offers on option contracts); U.C.C. § 2-205 (discussing firm offers).
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made in a highly formal writing-contains no assurance of firmness, it is
revocable at will, under the existing rules.' 3 Indeed, it is not possible to
speak of a traditional "option contract" without assuming the presence,
in some form, of an express promise of irrevocability. In proposing its
rule to make offers potentially irrevocable (or at least to protect pre-
acceptance reliance) Section 87(2) imitates Section 90 by protecting
offerees only where their reliance is such that justice demands
compensation. 4  Eisenberg specifically rejects that requirement of
reliance, at one point dismissing the issue of reliance under Section
87(2) as a "tedious inquiry." 5 But unless the offer in question also
contains an assurance that it will be held open, under traditional contract
rules it is revocable at will, and the offeree that invests in pre-
acceptance reliance ordinarily does so at its peril.
In Drennan v. Star Paving Co., the opinion that spawned Section
87(2), Justice Roger Traynor spelled out the particular aspects of
subcontractor bidding that made it appropriate in that case to protect the
offeror's pre-acceptance reliance. 16  The Drennan decision has been
used as precedent over and over, in similar bidding situations, but in
each of those cases there has been specific foreseeable reliance, and the
implication of a promise by the offeror not to revoke seems reasonable
in those circumstances. 7 Outside of the realm of subcontractor bidding,
however, Section 87(2) has not found widespread application. Perhaps,
as Professor Margaret Kniff'm and other commentators have suggested,
this limited applicability is because pre-acceptance reliance does not
seem to require legal protection unless the offeror has made a promise
(express or clearly implied) not to revoke, and even then only when
there has been substantial reliance in the expectation that the offer will
remain available for acceptance."
Eisenberg also places little or no emphasis on the question of form.
Most offers are made in writing, of course, but some are not. The
principal existing rules that permit legal enforcement of irrevocability in
the absence of conventional consideration or reliance do each contain a
requirement of form. Section 2-205 of the Code applies only to an offer
13. This is clearly the case both under Section 2-205 of the Code and, in the
absence of reliance, under Section 87(2) of the Second Restatement. U.C.C. § 2-205;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(2). As for Section 87(1) of
the Second Restatement, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 87(2), 90.
15. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 291.
16. 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958).
17. The case law is discussed at length, and the general rule is adopted in
Holman Erection Co. v. Orville E. Madsen & Sons, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 693, 695-97
(Minn. 1983).
18. See Kniffin, supra note 11, at 23-24.
2004:309
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made by a merchant in a signed writing.' 9 In addition, by requiring a
separate signing for the "firmness" term, Section 2-205 makes at least a
modest attempt to allow for the possibility (which Eisenberg does not
acknowledge) that an offeror might be manipulated by an offeree into
making an unintendedly "firm" offer. 20 Although Section 87(1) of the
Second Restatement does not require that the offeror be a "merchant"
(in the Code's definition 21 or any other sense), it does require a writing,
one that contains a formal recital of "purported" consideration. 22 And
like Section 2-205, Section 87(1) also makes at least a gesture toward
protecting the unsophisticated offeror.23 The Restatement limits its
effect to the offer that "proposes an exchange on fair terms within a
reasonable time."24
By downplaying consideration, ignoring requirements of form,
dismissing reliance, and minimizing the possible distinction between
express and implied promises, Eisenberg is able to present us with a
proposed bright-line rule for "firm offers": irrevocability in the teeth of
attempted revocation and expectation damages in the event of breach."
Do any of those omissions really matter? Or am I just nitpicking here,
as we academics are wont to do? To test Eisenberg's proposed strong
and unqualified rule of offer-enforcement, consider the following
hypothetical case.
I have a friend who mentions to me that he is in the market for a
used car. I tell him I have a low-mileage recent-model Volkswagen
Beetle that I'm thinking of replacing. He is familiar with the car and its
condition, and he asks what I would want for it. I say I would sell it to
him for $10,000. He replies, I'll think it over and let you know. Let
me know in a week or so, I tell him, because I am thinking of trading it
in on a new one. Before I hear from him again, I discover that my
granddaughter is in need of a car to take to college with her in the fall,
and also that the fair market value of a car like mine is $12,000. I
telephone my friend, who is not at home, and leave on his machine the
19. U.C.C. § 2-205.
20. See id.
21. Id. § 2-104(1) ("'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.").
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87 cmt. c
("[Tihe giving and recital of nominal consideration performs a formal function only.
The signed writing has vital significance as a formality, while the ceremonial manual
delivery of a dollar or a peppercorn is an inconsequential formality.").
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(1)(a);
U.C.C. § 2-205.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(1)(a).
25. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 282, 291.
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message that I have changed my mind about selling him the car. Some
time later he calls me back, and after a little conversation in which I tell
him why I changed my mind (I might want to give the car to my
granddaughter; if not, I should be able to get more than $10,000 for it),
my friend declares that whether I like it or not he is accepting my offer.
Indeed, he says he will sue me for $2000 if I do not perform. It is less
than a week since we had our initial conversation.
Here there is no signed writing, no "record" of my offer. Of
course, I am honorable, and in any event not a perjurer, and so I would
admit having that conversation with my friend-although maybe my
honest recollection of it would differ a little from his. However,
because I did not make my offer in writing, Section 2-205 of the Code
would not apply here. 26 I am also not a used-car dealer (a dealer in
"goods involved in the transaction"), so I am not a "merchant" in the
narrow sense of the Code,27 and even though I do have some knowledge
of the law and business practice, this sale still would not be a transaction
in a "merchant's" capacity even in the broader sense of that term. So
Section 2-205 would not apply here for that reason as well.
As for the possible application of Section 87(1) of the Second
Restatement, again there is no writing here at all, much less one that
"recites a purported consideration." 2' And finally, as for Section 87(2),
there are no facts as yet stated (or likely) that would support a finding of
any pre-acceptance reliance by my friend, much less reliance that would
be deserving of any legal protection. 9 His only injury is a disappointed
expectation; he has lost a good bargain. Assuming that the fair market
value of the car is indeed that much higher than my offered price of
$10,000, could I be held to my offer, and thus be potentially liable to
my (former) friend for $2000? Under the generally accepted rules of
present-day contract law (common law or Article 2 of the Code), the
answer appears to be no. I could not be held to my offer because it was
effectively revoked before its acceptance. Under Eisenberg's analysis,
however, the answer appears to be yes. I could be held to my offer, and
maybe I should be.
To all of this, Eisenberg might well respond that in the real world
oral offers are seldom made, and that when they are made, the Statute of
Frauds will often bar their enforcement.3° Perhaps because contract law
generally operates in the area of bargaining between mercantile entities
26. U.C.C. § 2-205.
27. Id. § 2-104(1).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 87(1).
29. See id. § 87(2).
30. Note, however, that I will not deny our conversation, so under Section 2-
201(3)(b), I could not use that defense. U.C.C. § 2-201. Also, my telephone message
might, if regarded as a "record," be a sufficiently "admitting" one to constitute a
memorandum that would satisfy the statute of frauds.
2004:309
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in a commercial context, he might say further that in his analysis he was
tacitly assuming merchant-offerors in every case. Nor do I know if he
would regard my oral offer above as sufficiently "implying" an
assurance of irrevocability merely by stating a time by which acceptance
must be made; perhaps he would not. 3' But by fudging all of these
issues in his discussion, and categorically rejecting any requirement of
demonstrated reliance in favor of a pure expectation-based recovery, he
posits a general rule which not only goes well beyond classical contract
law but also beyond any generally accepted rule of present-day contract
law.
That does not make him wrong, of course. Reasonable observers
might well agree with Eisenberg's analysis. Indeed, I might well do so
myself, if it were amended or qualified to take account of some of the
misgivings voiced above. In its present form, however, it seems to fall
somewhat short of exemplifying what I think of as "modem contract
law." That is my other point, to which I will now turn.
Along with Professors Nathan M. Crystal and Harry G. Prince, I
am-like Professor Eisenberg and many of the other speakers at this
conference-one of the coauthors of a casebook designed for use in the
basic law school course in contracts. 32  Beginning with the book's
second edition in 1987, my colleagues and I have attempted over the
years to describe and contrast what we perceive as "classical contract
law" on the one hand and "modem contract law" on the other, and to
discuss the evolution of twentieth-century American contract law from
the former to the latter. For a while, it seemed to us as though "modem
contract law" was the direction in which the law was inevitably moving,
and that "modem" thus could be seen as roughly synonymous with
"present-day. ' 3  In the 1990s, the flood of law-and-economics analysis
31. Article 16(2)(a) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) appears to allow for this possibility, providing that
an offer cannot be revoked "if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for
acceptance or otherwise, that is it is irrevocable .... " U.N. Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods art. 16(2)(a) (1989). However, by its terms, the
CISG only applies to commercial contracts. Id. art. 2(a) (excluding consumer
transactions). Article 16(2)(b) also provides that an offer cannot be revoked if "it was
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has
acted in reliance on the offer." Id. art. 16(2)(b).
32. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW (5th ed. 2003).
33. What is considered "modern" today will not be thought so tomorrow, of
course. And indeed, the term "modern" is itself not particularly modern. At least as
early as the 1920s, it was being used to mean "up-to-date" or "not stuffy." As the
twentieth century progressed, we had "art moderne," the Museum of Modern Art,
Modern -imes (the Charlie Chaplin film), the magazines Modern Screen and Modern
Romances, and, of course, the "Modern Jazz Quartet." By 1967, the movie Thoroughly
Modern Millie was taking an ironic backward glance at the 1920s; on Broadway today,
the stage version of Thoroughly Modern Millie adds yet another layer of irony. Being
"modern" now seems, well, pretty twentieth century. So that is the sense in which I am
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threatened to inundate the domain of contract law (and everything else).
That wave appears to have crested, and yet contract law, like American
culture in general, seems unable to pull itself together. By the time my
colleagues and I were preparing the most recent edition of our casebook
in 2003, we concluded that-reluctantly or not-we should face the
facts. Contract law at present is hopelessly split, and in some cases
splintered, over many different issues and it shows no immediate sign of
reconciliation.
From this vantage point, therefore, it seems not only difficult but
not even particularly useful to continue to talk about "modem contract
law" as though such a thing presently existed as a coherent body of law.
Perhaps the label "postmodern contract law" has some appeal, although
what its content would be is anyone's guess. In this state of things, I
suggest that the rubric "Modem Contract Law" ("MCL") could be
better employed as a roughly accurate label for the kind of approach to
contract law that came to flower over the middle half of the twentieth
century. MCL in this sense is particularly identified with certain judges
(Benjamin Cardozo and Roger Traynor may be the most prominent
examples) and commentators (such as Arthur Corbin and Karl
Llewellyn), and to some extent can be seen in both the First and Second
Restatements, as well as pervasively in Article 2 of the Code.
As contrasted with what came before it, how might this MCL be
described? Some of its characteristics follow.
1. Realism about law. First and foremost, MCL does not see itself
as consisting of stone tablets handed down from the top of Mount
Sinai-or the steps of Langdell Hall, for that matter. It is frankly a
series of policy choices made by someone, somewhere; it can and
should be justified or attacked on the basis of the soundness of those
choices. Neither authority nor logic, separately or together, can be seen
as sufficient for the creation and maintenance of a legal system. Or, at
least, of a desirable one.
2. Emphasis on law in context. Particularly with respect to
commercial context, but in other respects as well, the law-whether
legislative or judicially created-should be formed and applied with an
understanding of the circumstances in which it will do its work. This is
congruent with a greater willingness to let cases be decided, often by
juries on the basis of facts, rather than by judges "as a matter of law."
3. Preference for substance over form. On this point, the view of
Professor Corbin at least was particularly clear, as witness his treatment
of the parol evidence rule. 34 Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code is
generally in accord by stressing the parties' "agreement in fact" over
suggesting we use that word.
34. See generally 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-
96 (1960).
2004:309
HeinOnline -- 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 317 2004
318 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
legal technicalities. 35 In this respect, present-day contract law is notably
schizophrenic, with formalism (or "conceptualism") playing a resurgent
role .36
4. More attention to "equitable "factors. MCL is characterized by
a number of ameliorating features: some expansion of defenses not
favored by classical contract law; a willingness to explore and apply
notions of "fairness" and yes, even "justice"; more attention to reliance
and "reasonable expectations." All these seem to have been much more
a part of MCL than they are characteristic of contract law today.
37
5. Preference for standards over rules. Professor Duncan Kennedy
years ago explored the ways in which these two approaches differ, and
suggested a series of factors that might have led the shapers of MCL to
be more at home with balancing-act standards than with bright-line
rules.38 Notions like "good faith" and "commercial reasonableness" are
examples here.
6. Emphasis on the behavior of contracting parties. This emphasis
to some extent duplicates items above, but I am thinking here
particularly about an increased appreciation for the role of "relational"
contract analysis, as advanced by Professor Ian Macneil and others,39 as
well as an increasing openness to the possibility of the sort of legally
enforceable contract to bargain in good faith that I and others have
explored.40
7. Sensitivity to imbalances in bargaining power. If classical
contract law was affected by this factor, it was indeed covertly, as
Llewellyn suggested.4 The resurgence of interest in the concept of
"unconscionability," both in the Code and in contract law generally, is
characteristic of the heyday of MCL, in the 1960s and 1970s.42
35. See U.C.C § 2-202 & cmts.
36. See generally Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
37. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law during
the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 203 (1990); Knapp, supra note 3.
38. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
39. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and
Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (2000).
40. See infra notes 49-51.
41. See Karl Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)
(reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
42. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). Unconscionability is enjoying
somewhat of a revival at the moment, thanks to the heavy-handed application that the
U.S. Supreme Court has given to the Federal Arbitration Act. See Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
761, 796-97 & n. 118-19 (2002).
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8. Recognition of the adhesion contract problem. This is an area
of concern first identified and analyzed in the MCL era. Since the mid-
twentieth century, commentators like Professor Friedrich Kessler and
others have alerted us to the fact that contracts of adhesion are not only
pervasive, but anomalous (with respect to contractual notions of assent)
and problematic (in terms of social policy). 4' By now we all know that
there is indeed an adhesion-contract elephant in the contract-law corner,
but many of the contributors to present-day contract law apparently see
this as neither anomalous nor problematic.
. There are probably others that could be added to the above list, but
hopefully the ones listed above ring true for my readers as being roughly
descriptive of the ascendant view of contract law during the middle half
of the twentieth century. If this list of attitudes and approaches is fairly
descriptive of MCL, how does Eisenberg's analysis fit into that mold?
In one important respect, Eisenberg's discussion is admirably
MCL; in its steadfast insistence that a system of legal rules cannot be
maintained and justified simply on the basis of axioms and deductions.
His words are worth repeating here: "Formal legal reasoning is not
defensible.... No significant doctrinal proposition can be justified on
the ground that it is self-evident. Rather, doctrinal propositions can be
ultimately justified only by propositions of morality, policy, and
experience. ""
MCL could not agree more, and many of us would also concur.
The problem comes when Eisenberg goes on to practice what he has just
preached. He does indeed put forward reasons of policy to justify his
conclusions, of course, and often quite tellingly. But in other important
respects, his discussion seems to me to be largely oblivious-and in
some cases actively resistant-to the MCL perspective. By proposing a
simplified rule of legal-irrevocability-plus-expectation-protection,
Eisenberg glosses over or actively resists a number of the MCL precepts
suggested above.
To begin with, his proposed rule rejects the nuances of both form
and substance reflected in the rules of the Second Restatement and the
Code. There is no apparent allowance in his scheme for the possibility
that a written offer might be treated differently from an oral one, that an
offer by a merchant might be viewed (and reacted to) differently than
one from a nonmerchant, that in some cases offerors will clearly invite
reliance while in others they will have no reason to foresee it, that in
some cases offerors may be vulnerable to and overreached by
43. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts
of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (discussing the
scholarship in this area and proposing a new approach of his own).
44. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 281.
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sophisticated offerees, or that in some cases an offeror will make an
impulsive and ill-considered offer that she later has good reason to
regret (and indeed to revoke) with no resulting injury to the offeree
other than the loss of a windfall expectation. Eisenberg's analysis thus
rejects the kind of concerns about social context and bargaining behavior
that are at the heart of the MCL scheme.4 5
By insisting on not merely the primacy but the inevitability of an
expectation-based remedy for the disappointed offeree, Eisenberg is also
choosing to ignoring a mountain of scholarship-law-and-economics and
other kinds as well-that explores the relative merits and demerits, and
in some cases the possibility or impossibility, of protecting the various
remedial "interests" of expectation, reliance, and restitution. Some of
this scholarship is largely theoretical, while some is devoted to a
painstaking examination of what courts have actually done.46 Much of it
goes well beyond MCL, of course, and not all of it is persuasive, to say
the least. But Eisenberg's across-the-board insistence on expectation
damages in all cases seems not only too broad-brush, but dangerously
close to the kind of reasoning-from-axioms that he elsewhere deplores.
At this point in his analysis, I wonder whether some of his contracts-
teaching readers were reminded, as I was, of the well-known "Johnny-
and-the-car" dialogue, in which Professor Williston stoutly insisted that
the remedy for promissory estoppel had to be pure expectation damages,
because, dammit, a contract is a contract.47
45. As an example, consider Eisenberg's suggested rule that the published offer
of a reward-a "true unilateral" case-should be revocable only as against someone who
actually learns of the revocation, as opposed to the traditional rule that revocation can be
made by a similar publication. The possibility that his rule might make it difficult or
impossible to withdraw such an offer troubles him a little, but not much. Eisenberg
states that "[i]f the offeror did not want to get into that position, he could have refrained
from making a general offer, or qualified the offer appropriately." Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 303. But again, such an across-the-board rule seems unduly rigid. Reward
offers may sometimes be made as an emotional reaction to a violent crime or other
traumatic event. For this reason, it seems a bit hard to say that the offeror who has
second thoughts about the wisdom of making such an offer should as a practical matter
not be able to effectively revoke it.
46. And some of it is by Professor Eisenberg. See, e.g., Robert Cooter &
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1432
(1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv.
741 (1982).
47. Of course he did not actually say dammit. What he did say was "[e]ither
the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be enforced as it is
made." 4 A.L.I. PROC. 103 (1926). The occasion was the American Law Institute's
discussion of proposed Section 90 of the First Restatement. Williston was asked his
opinion as to the proper measure of damages if an uncle promised his nephew "Johnny"
$1000 to buy a car and Johnny in reliance on the promise did buy a car, but only spent
$500 on it; Williston responded that the uncle should be liable for the full $1000. See
id. Professor Williston said a lot more besides the language quoted above; the whole
exchange is reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 339-49 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed.
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Another aspect of Eisenberg's discussion that seems quintessentially
"classical" in its approach is its narrow view of both contract law and
contracting behavior.4 ' His description of the contracting process is
basically the offer-and-acceptance "tennis game" analogy: the offeror
serves one over the net; the offeree returns it; if that stroke was a
counteroffer, then the offeror hits it back again, and this continues until
the "game" is over.49 You always know where the ball is, and can
follow the play with ease. This is, of course, the classic Langdellian
casebook view of contract formation. In the real world, however, the
contracting process is often much more complicated, much messier, and
much fuzzier, than the tennis-game model can capture: a chess match, a
football scrimmage, or even a courtship could furnish equally useful
metaphors.
Eisenberg's view of contract creation is also a simplified one, of
the "light-switch" variety; one instant it is off, the next instant it is on:
"At the instant that a bargain contract is formed by offer and
acceptance, a promisor becomes potentially liable for expectation
damages, and this is so even if he changes his mind a nanosecond
later. "-
In Section 2-204 of the Code, however, MCL takes a broader
approach: "[an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined." 5'
And the notion that the formation of a complicated contract often
1995).
48. Equally classical is his extended discussion early in the piece of the
question whether an "offer" is a "promise." Not only is the discussion tangential to his
general argument, which could be made without it, the whole passage echoes dusty
argumentation from a long-lost age of contract scholarship. See George W. Goble, Is an
Offer a Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 567 (1928); Frederick Green, Is an Offer Always a
Promise?, 23 ILL. L. REV. 95 (1928); Frederick Green, Is an Offer Always a Promise?,
23 ILL. L. REV. 301 (1928); Samuel Williston, An Offer is a Promise, 23 ILL. L. REV.
100 (1928); Samuel Williston, An Offer Is a Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 788 (1928). All
of these articles are reprinted in A.A.L.S., SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 199-220 (1931).
49. In an earlier version of his article, presented in draft form to the Freedom
from Contract Symposium, Eisenberg asserted that "many or most contracts are formed
by a sequential exchange of offer and acceptance." Whether this is so highly
questionable, depends on how you characterize the process of standardized-form mass
contracting (and also on whether you view the checkout at the supermarket as being a
form of offer and acceptance). In the final version of his article, Eisenberg retreats
somewhat from his earlier assertion: contractual liability can indeed attach without an
offer and acceptance, or even without a bargain at all, he concedes; nevertheless, even if
offer and acceptance is "only one road to contractual liability," it remains "an extremely
important road." Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 271.
50. Id.
51. U.C.C. § 2-204(2). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6,
§ 22(2) is to the same effect.
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involves stages of agreement is by now not a novel one. Whether one
speaks of a "contract to bargain,"" an "agreement to negotiate, " 53 or a
"binding preliminary commitment, "4 the lesson is essentially the same:
sometimes contracts are formed not by flipping a switch, but by
gradually turning up a dimmer.
Of course the classical world of offer and acceptance still exists.
People do make offers, counteroffers, acceptances, rejections, and
revocations. But the world of present-day contracting for the most part
is neither that individualized nor that genteel. Simple exchanges and
contracts of adhesion: those are the world of contracting today, for all
but the most privileged few. Eisenberg is both a very smart and a very
wise man, and his painstaking mapping of the terrain of an ideal law of
contract has over the years furnished us all with invaluable guidance as
we make our own individual ways along the path. All of my
observations above must be seen against that background. In this
instance, though, whatever one thinks of his reasoning or its
conclusions, it is difficult to escape the feeling that we are being urged
once more to reupholster the Victorian sofa in the parlor, where hardly
anyone ever sits any more, instead of renovating the family room,
bumping out the kitchen, or maybe even looking at the real-estate ads.
52. See Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 673, 673-74 (1969).
53. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 263
(1987).
54. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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